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CAPITALISM, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE SUPREME COURT*
By HUGH EvAN i WnLs * *
INcomB TAXES
The extent to which the Supreme Court has allowed the
capitalistic system to be affected by income taxes is interest-
ing. In the case of ,Springer v. United States,'125 it upheld,
by a unanimous decision, the Civil War income tax law
on the theory that the income tax was not a direct tax but
an excise tax. But in the case of Pollock v. The Farmers L. and
7'. Co.,126 decided in that period when Justice Field was having
his greatest influence, the Supreme Court, by a five to four
majority, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Fuller, whose
great ambition seemed to be to outfield Field, held that an in-
come tax was a direct tax and, therefore, unconstitutional unless
apportioned according to the impracticable plan of the Constitu-
tion. As a result of this decision, the 16th Amendment was
incorporated into the Constitution, and in the case of Brushaber
v. Union Pacific By. Co.,: 27 the Supreme Court held that a
federal income tax was thereby made an excise tax. Yet, in
Bisner v. Macamber, 128 by another five to four decision, the
Supreme Court held that an income tax on stock dividends was
a direct tax. The case of Eisner v. Macomber adopted as the
test for income the cash basis. Since that time the Supreme
Court has gradually adopted the accrual basis in place of the
cash basis.1 29 The subjection of property to income taxes is
another important limitation upon the capitalistic system.
* Continued from the March, 1934, issue of the Kentucky Law
Journal.
** A. B. 1897, M. A. 1899, LL. D. 1925, Yankton College; LL. B.
1901, LL. M. 1902, University of Minnesota. Professor of Law, Indiana
University. Author of Principles of Law of Contracts, Principles of
Law of Damages, Law of Social Justice, Introduction to Anglo-Amer-
ican Law.
(1880), 102 U. S. 586.
(1895), 157 U. S. 429.
" (1916), 240 U. S. 1.
(1920), 252 U. S. 189.
JNorth American Oil ConsoZ. v. Burnet (1932), 286 U. S. 417;
Magill, When Is Income Realized? 46 Harv. I. Rev. 933.
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ANTI-TRUST LAws.
In the case of United. States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Assn.,3 0 and United States v. Joint Traffic Assn.,' 3 ' (some
more decisions of the nineties), the Supreme Court held, by a
five to four and five to three decision respectively, that the
prohibitions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890,
"apply to all contracts in restraint of interstate or foreign
trade or commerce without exception or limitation, and are not
confined to those in which the restraint is unreasonable." But
in 1911, when Chief Justice White, a dissenter, and Justice
Harlan, a majority justice of 1896, were the only two members
still left on the bench, the Supreme Court, in opinions written
by Chief Justice White,132 held that the Anti-Trust Act should
be construed in the light of reason, and when so construed it
prohibits only contracts and combinations "which amount to
an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate com-
merce." Only nine years later, in 1920, the Supreme Court,
in the case of United States v. United States Steel Corpora-
tion,133 held that the Anti-Trust Act should be construed in the
light of "the risk of injury to the public interest" and "detri-
ment to the foreign trade." With these decisions, the United
States Supreme Court freed business from most of the restric-
tions contemplated by the Anti-Trust Act.
PICE FIXING.
With the case of Wilson v. New, 34 the United States Su-
preme Court almost opened the door to price fixing of wages in
public callings, but this door was quickly closed by the case of
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
Kansas.3 1  And in the case of Williams v. The Standard Oil
Company,' 36 the Supreme Court held emphatically that a legis-
lature is without power to fix prices unless the business or prop-
3" (1897), 166 U. S. 290.
= (1898), 171 U. S. 505.
21Standard Off Co. of Ngew Jersey v. United States (1911), 221
U. S. 1; United States v. American Tobacco Co. (1911), 221 U. S. 106.
(1920), 251 U. S. 417. See also, United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co. (1927), 273 U. S. 392.
(1917), 243 U. S. 332.
M (1923) 262 U. S. 522.
' (1929), 278 U. S. 235.
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erty involved is affected with a public interest, and even this
exception did not include the fixing of wages of employees work-
ing for public callings. But only two years later, in O'Gorman
and Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 7 it held it constitutional
to regulate the compensation of insurance agents, and only one
year later in the case of Stevenson v. Binford,138 it held that it
was constitutional to fix prices of private contract carriers out-
side of public callings. These decisions seem to have broken the
taboo against price fixing. If so, we may be about to enter upon
a new era of social control of business in a greater way than
iL has ever been exercised before.
LIERT PRoEECTmED.
Without giving in detail any further illustrations of the
control of business exercised by the courts under the due process
clause, a few general references will be made to cases of where
the courts have favored capitalism and some general illustrations
of where they have favored social control First, some illustra-
tions of where they have favored capitalism will be given. The
courts have favored capitalism by holding that a law is uncon-
stitutional which requires all children between eight and sixteen
to attend the public schools ;139 by holding that an ordinance is
unconstitutional which forbids the covering of fruit with colored
netting;140 by holding that it is unconstitutional to segregate
the races geographically,' 4 1 ; by holding that it is unconstitu-
tional to forbid the sale of provisions and liquor where dry
goods are also sold,' 4 2 by holding that neither theaters,143 nor
employment agencies, 144 nor sellers of gasoline, 145 nor manufac-
turers of ice' 46 can be regulated as public callings; and by hold-
ing that employers cannot have the remedy of injunction taken
1" (1931) 282 U. S. 251.
It (1932), 53 S. Ct. 181. The New York milk case decided after
this article was first written is an even more striking case of price
fixing. Nebbia v. People of N. Y. (1934), 54 S. Ct. 505.
ierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), 268 U. S. 510.
'-'Frost v. Chicago (1899), 178 Ill. 250.
1aBuchanan v. Warley (1917), 245 U. S. 60.
City of Chicago v. Netcher (1899), 183 Ill. 104.
2"Tyson, et al. v. Banton, et al. (1927), 273 U. S. 418.
1Ribnik v. McBride (1928), 277 U. S. 350.
-5Williams v. Standard Oil Co. (1929), 278 U. S. 235.
2'New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932), 285 U. S. 262.
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away from them,147 and by upholding freedom of speech and
the press against censorship (even by injunction).148 Capitalism
has also been protected by the supernal postulate of the United
States Supreme Court that taxation, in order to be legal, must
be for a public purpose ;149 by its gradual prevention of multi-
taxation ;15o and by its prohibition of retroactive gift taxes.151
SoCoAL. CONTROL UPHELD
Those who have had the opinion that the United States
Supreme Court has been dominated by our economic order in-
stead of dominating our economic order and that it has pro-
tected property, corporations, and financiers, rather than the
general social interests have a surprise coming to them when
they learn what has been the real work of the United States
Supreme Court in connection with the due process clause. The
control which the Supreme Court has exercised over the eco-
nomic order has been through its legalization of the police
power and the power of taxation and the power of eminent
domain. In these respective fields, it has permitted so much
social control that it has both made a good part of our social
control, especially through its recognition of social interests,
and has placed remarkable limitations upon the personal liberty
and individualism of our capitalistic system.
In developing the police power, it has perhaps established
and put into operation more social control than in connection
with any other power. Thus, it has upheld liquor laws for the
protection of the social interests in health, safety and morals.152
It has upheld compulsory vaccination laws for the protection
of the social interest in social health.153 A state court has up-
held, and the United States Supreme Court would undoubtedly
concur in upholding a statute requiring owners to raise the
.T Truax v. Corrigan (1921), 257 U. S. 312.
'4 Near v. Minnesota (1931), 283 U. S. 697.
"'Loan Assn. v. Tofpeca (1875), 20 Wall. 655; Green v. Frazier;
(1920), 253 U. S. 233.
10 Frickc v. Pennsylvania (1925), 268 U. S. 473; Baldwin v. Missouri
(1930), 281 U. S. 586; First National Bank of Boston v. Maine (1932),
284 U. S. 312.
=Coolidge v. Long (1931), 282 U. S. 582.
2m License Cases (1847), 5 How. 504; Mugler v. Kansas (1887), 123
U. S. 623.
1Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), 197 U. S. 11.
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grade of their land for the preservation of the public health.
54
It has upheld an ordinance providing for segregation of lewd
characters in order to protect the social interest in morals.) 5
It has forbidden the sale of stock on margin for the protection
of the social interest in morals and in general progress.' 5 6 It
has upheld statutes prohibiting the use of coupons by business
men in order to protect the social interest in morals.' 5 7 It has
upheld a requirement for the stoppage of interstate trains in
cities of fairly large population for the protection of the social
interest in safety.' 5 8 It has upheld zoning laws for the pro-
tection of the social interest in the aesthetic (although for other
pretended social interests).'59 It has upheld statutes forbidding
the assignment of future wages to protect the social interest in
public health and the social institution of the home. 160 State
courts have upheld the comnnission of children to institutions for
delinquent children;161 and the interdiction of marriages be-
tween imbeciles, the feeble-minded, and epileptics;162 and the
United States Supreme Court has upheld sterilization laws,' 63 all
for the protection of the social interest in our human social re-
sources. State courts have upheld the killing of deseased ani-
mals for the protection of the social interest in property re-
sources and in health.' 4  The Supreme Court has upheld stat-
utes controlling the escape of gas and oil from wells for the pro-
tection of economic social resources.' 6 State courts have up-
held statutes requiring incorporation as a condition to the
privilege of doing banking for the protection of the social in-
terest in general security.' 66 The Supreme Court has upheld
statutes making cities absolutely liable for damage done by
mobs to protect the same social interest in general security.
1 6 7
25'Nickerson v. Boston (1881), 131 Mass. 306.
'mL'Hote v. New Orleans (1900), 177 U. S. 587.
'"Otis v. Parker (1903), 187 U. S. 606.
2URast v. Van Deman (1916), 240 U. S. 342.
mLake Shore and M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio (1899), 173 U. S. 285.
U* Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U. S. 365.
21 'Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell (1911), 222 U. S. 225.
"'Ex parte Sharp (1908), 15 Idaho 120.
16Gould v. Gould (1905), 78 Conn. 242.
10 Buck v. Bell (1927), 274 U. S. 200.
'G'Miller v. Horton (1891), 152 Mass. 540.
106Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (1900), 177 U. S. 190; Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., et al. (1920), 254 U. S. 300.
'"6Weed v. Berg& (1910), 141 Wis. 569.
IV City of Chicago v. Sturges (1911), 222 U. S. 313.
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It has upheld an assessment on banks for a depositors' guaranty
fund 68 and the liability of the directors of a bank for taking
deposits after the bank's insolvency'0 9 in order to protect the
social interest in general security. It has upheld statutes for-
bidding unfair competition by combinations for the purpose of
injuring other competitors for the protection of the social in-
terest in general economic progress.' 70 State courts have upheld
limitations on ownership of property to prohibit spite fences
for the protection of the social interest in peace.'17  State courts
have upheld statutes forbidding the creation of monopolies, 72
and both state courts and the United States Supreme Court have
upheld workmen's compensation laws173 for the protection of the
social interest in general progress. The Supreme Court has
upheld the forfeiture of property used to violate the law in
order to protect the social interest in our political institutions. 174
Enough has been given to show both the extent of constitu-
tional control of business and the judicial creation of sjcial con-
trol. It is apparent from the few illustrations which have been
given how extensive is the work of the Supreme Court in the
creation of law. If the purpose- of law is the creation of a
better social order by the protection of necessary social interests,
it is apparent at once how important is the work of the Supreme
Court when it determines the social interest which shall be pro-
tected by law.
Only a few typical illustrations of the social control which
the United States Supreme Court has permitted through the
taxing power will be given. In Green v. Frazier,175 the Supreme
Court held that there was a sufficient public purpose for taxa-
tion in the government ownership program of the state of North
Dakota. In the case of State Board of Indiana v. Jackson,170
it held that a state could constitutionally provide for graduated
- Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911), 219 U. S. 104.
10 Coombes v. Getz (1932), 285 U. S. 434.170Aikens v. Wisconsin (1904), 195 U. S. 194; Grenada Lbr. Co. v.
Mississipi (1910), 217 U. S. 433.
u7Rideout v. Knox (1889), 148 Mass. 368.
12 momonwealth v. Strauss (1906), 191 Mass. 545.
-s State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer (1912), 85 Ohio St. 349; Chicago
B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire (1911), 219 U. S. 549.
'-"3. W. Goldsmith, Jr.Grant Co v. United States (1921), 254 U. S.
505.
1 (1920), 253 U. S. 233.
178 (1931), 283 U. S. 527.
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excise taxes on chain stores without violating the equality clause.
In Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United
States,177 it held that the United States government could levy
a tax upon goods imported by a state university from a foreign
country, though the state university was an agency of the state,
without violating our dual form of government, because the
doctrine of a dual form of government does not apply so far as
concerns foreign affairs. These decisions are enough to show
how much liberty the United States Supreme Court will permit
the states or the federal government in the matter of taxation
of business enterprises and property.
In the matter of eminent domain, the state courts and the
United States Supreme Court, in applying the constitutional
]imitation against the taking of private property for a public
use without just compensation, have often held that there is a
public use when the property taken would be useful to the pub-
lic,1Th although state courts and the United States Supreme
Court have sometimes required a use by the public.
1 7 9 So far
as concerns taking, there has been a division in the cases. Some
have taken the position that there must be a taking of a physical
thing or a deposit of a physical substance on something owned
before there can be a taking.'80 But other cases have taken the
position that there has been a taking whenever any rights of
ownership are taken from an owner.' 81 And some have gone so
far as to hold there is a taking of property when property has
been damaged. 182 Such decisions as this, of course, would pro-
tect property rather than social control, and all of the more
liberal eminent domain cases would seem to have this effect were
it not for the fact that the courts have been very liberal in draw-
ing the line between the police power and eminent domain so as
" (1933), 53 S. Ct. 509.
18 People v. Salem (1870), 20 Mich. 452; Talbot v. Hudson (1860),
16 Gray 417; Clark v. Nash (1905), 198 U. S. 361.
- Hairston v. Danville, Etc., Co. (1908), 208 U. S. 598; State ex rel.
Tacoma By. Co. v. The White River Power Co. (1905), 39 Wash. 648;
Brown v. Gerald (1905), 100 Maine 351; Towns v. Klamath County
(1898), 33 Ore. 225; Matter of Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co.
(1888), 108 N. Y. 375.
2 Eaton v. B. Cf. and M. R. R. (1872), 51 N. H. 504.
'a Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tram-Way Co. (1887), 32 Fed. 727.
Rigney v. Chicago (1882), 102 II1. 64.
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to permit a great many forms of social control as proper exer-
cises of the police power. 183
However, there is some constitutional law which seems to
protect neither property nor social control, and this embraces
most of what we call criminal law. A great many of the consti-
tutional guaranties were originally put into, the Constitution for
the purpose of protecting innocent people against arbitrary
social control. Under our technical system of legal procedure,
most of these provisions (which were originally developed in
English law to protect the guilty) have been perverted to the
protection of criminals, so that they are enabled to prey both
upon our economic order and upon our political order. Orderly
human progress, so far as it depends upon private ownership
of property, requires, on the one hand, the establishment of
man's creative and constructive ability over nature's resources
and, on the other hand, a system of institutional control to pre-
vent the activities of those who would interfere with such ability
and to secure the wealth resulting from individual work from
being snatched away by social parasites. Under our political
system, the first condition of humdn material progress has been
realized through the inventive genius and technological develop-
ntent of industry, but the second condition has not been met.
Government has allowed racketeering, unfair competition, lobby-
ing, and many other unfair social practices to interfere with the
abilities of those who would create new wealth; and it has al-
lowed larceny, robbery, burglary, embezzlement, stock gambling,
lotteries, high finance and many other schemes to get wealth
without producing it to enable individuals to interfere with the
security of acquisitions.
GOVERNIMNT OWNrRSnIP
The story of constitutional social control has been only half
told. Not only has the United States Supreme Court set up a
scheme of social control to regulate the conduct of capitalism
where it has been given freedom to own property and to conduct
enterprises, but it has set up a scheme of social control which
places important limitations upon ownership and operation
-American Print Works v. Lawrence (1851), 23 N. J. Law 590;
MoDavitt v. People's Natural Gas Co. (1894), 160 Pa. 367; Palmer v.
Larchmont Blectric Co. (1899), 158 N. Y. 231.
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themselves.18 4 There are important vocations or fields of busi-
ness in the United States, into which at the present time private
capital is not permitted to enter. The industries of communica-
tion and transportation are in the process of passing out of the
realm of private ownership. The conveyance of letters and par-
cels, and the construction and maintenance of highways are
matters of public enterprise. The transmission of telegrams
and telephonic communications and railroad transportation are
still in the hands of private individuals, although there are some
evidences that these may be in the process of passing from pri-
vate hands to public hands. But services which minister to the
public health, like water supply, drainage of cities, street clean-
ing, and medical services are coming increasingly under public
ownership and control. Various employment enterprises, like
the drainage of marshes, dredging of rivers, construction (f
sewers, dikes, and irrigation systems, are matters exclusively
for government. Nearly the whole industry of education has
passed out of the realm of private ownership. The industry of
recreation, which brings within its scope public parks, zoological
gardens, public libraries, public concerts, etc., are governmental
in nature. Fire departments are also owned and operated by
governments. Some of the largest producers of books and
printed matter are governmental agencies. The United States
government has embarked upon postal savings bank business,
and there is a possibility of the Federal Reserve system becom-
ing entirely governmental. Private ownership is denied more
and more in the industry of making and distributing light, heat
and power, whether by gas, electricity or water under hydraulic
pressure. Public ownership is beginning to make significant in-
roads, in the business of housing, forestry, agriculture, mining
and even manufacture and distribution. Taken all together,
these make a formidable list of businesses denied to our capital-
istic system. In other words, social control in all of these re-
spects has been applied to the personal liberty of our capitalistic
system.
Such has been the relation up to date between capitalism
2"Caiflornia v. Pacific Ry. Co. (1888), 127 U. S. 139; Minnesota
Rate Cases (1913), 230 U. S. 352; Joneg v. City of Portland (1917),
245 U. S. 217; Green v. Frazier (1920), 253 U. S. 233; Standard Oil Co.
v. Lincoln (1927), 275 U. S. 504; 25 Mich. L. Rev. 599, 607; 6 St. Johns
Law Rev. 314; 18 Cal. Law Rev. 248.
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and the social control provided by the Supreme Court and the
Constitution created by it. Yet the Supreme Court has as yet
neither given enough protection to capitalism to save it from
the danger of self-destruction nor enough momentum to the
social control of capitalism to realize the goal of law, whether
that goal be regarded as social happiness or racial perfection.
PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPITALISM
Capitalism has as its philosophy emphasized individual
liberty, the economic laws of competition, supply and demand,
laissez faire, and private ownership of property. It has always
been opposed to social control or economic planning by govern-
ment. Adam Smith 85 gave six characteristics of capitalism:
private property, private enterprise, individual initiative, profit
motive, wealth, and competition. Business men, lawyers gen-
erally, and many economists continue to think of capitalism in
these terms. They think what once was still continues to be.
Yet it can be quickly shown that most of these characteristics
have ceased to exist, not because of the work of government, but
of capitalism itself.'8 6
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Private property, for the most part, is no longer what it
was in the day of Adam Smith. The division of property into
active and passive ownership was unknown by him. Formerly,
control was a universal function of ownership. Now, in in-
dustry, it has become a separate factor apart both from owner-
ship and management though it is moving in the direction of
management control. In the beginning, ownership consisted of
the unity of interest in the enterprise, of power over it, and of
acting with respect to it. By the nineteenth century, in in-
dustry, the first two only belonged to the owners who hired
managers to perform the third. Now, all three have been sepa-
rated. At the present time, people called owners own only an
interest in the enterprise. Their situation is practically that of
creditors who have loaned money, only for dividends instead of
Weath of Nations.
m Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property;
Laski, Democracy in Crisis.
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interest. Corporation control takes five different forms: first,
complete ownership; second, majority control, as in the Ford
Automobile Company through the ownership of a majority of
the stock; third, control by a legal device, as in the field of
public utilities through holding companies or voting trusts, etc.;
fourth, minority control, as in the case of John D. Rockfeller
and the Standard Oil Company of Indiana through proxy
schemes, etc.; and fifth, management control, as in the case of
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the rail-
roads through a proxy committee. Corporations in which there
is complete ownership are six percent by number and two per-
cent by wealth. Corporations in which there is majority control
are five percent by number and four percent by wealth. Corpora-
tions in which there is control by a legal device are twenty-one
percent by number and twenty-two percent by wealth. Corpora-
tions in which there is minority control are twenty-three per
cent by number and fourteen percent by wealth. Corporation&
in which there is management control are forty-four percent by
number and fifty-eight percent by wealth. Ownership, there-
fore, is becoming more dispersed like a centrifugal force, and
control is becoming more concentrated like a centripetal force.
As control becomes concentrated, power becomes widened. At
the present time, industry is dominated by the economic auto-
crats who have acquired control of corporations. Yet they are
not the owners of the corporations.
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
In the same way, corporate enterprise has supplanted priv-
ate enterprise. The only room for initiative in the United States
today in corporations is the room enjoyed -by a dozen or so men
in control of the organization. For the owners and workers, indi-
vidual initiative has disappeared. Under the factory system,
there was a single management. The wage earner surrendered
the direction of his labor for wages. Under the modern quasi
public corporation where the wealth of the many has been
placed under the control of a few, the property owner has sur-
rendered the direction of his wealth for the wages of capitalism.
The owners have no responsibility.
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INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE
In the United States, individual initiative is being de-
stroyed. At least all the good in it is being destroyed, and only
the bad is being retained. Yet here, also, this is not due to the
judges but to the financiers. The government is to blame only
in a negative way. The corporations are to blame in an affirma-
tive way. At first, in the United States, individualism expressed
the agricultural economy. Then the traders, craftsmen and
capitalists generally, crying "Laissez fairc," set themselves free
from old restrictions. Laissez faire, starting as a liberation of
individualism has, however, developed one of the worst forms of
tyranny, although it is still justified and defended in the
name of freedom. The responsible individual entrepreneur has
been replaced by the non-responsible corporation. The corpora-
tion has succeeded to the position formerly occupied by the
feudal lord. Corporations have thrived upon the investment of
the thrifty accumulations of the many, and the evasion of per-
sonal, social, and political responsibility. More recently, be-
cause the credit structure is the core of modern finance, the
banker and his scheme of values have been set up as the head of
the corporations; and money, consequently, has become king.
This consummation has been accomplished behind a screen; yet
it is none the less an accomplishment. Financiers and industrial-
ists have abused and manipulated our political democracy for
their own purposes. Their power has become so great that it
has been customary to speak of "the interests" as an invisible
government. Thus, within the superficial framework of a po-
litical structure postulated on free and individual farmers,
there has been built up an economic heirarchy which has reduced
the individuals concentrated very largely in the cities to de-
pendent wage workers. Men have ceased to be personalities-
planning, choosing, and judging-and have become more and
more interchangeable machine parts handled like inanimate
objects, only with the difference that things without life are
guarded and cared for as things with life are not. Individuals
have ceased more and more to be personalities with rights and
powers and have become more and more links in a chain of
causation. The corporation has operated like an army on
rugged individualism.
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PROFIT MOTIVE
The profit motive which the classical economists have so
much emphasized is no longer operating as they prophesied that
it would operate. The mQdern owners under our corporate
system get the profit, but this does not motivate them to a more
efficient use of their property for they have no control. Any
spiritual values which used to attach to their ownership are gone.
The wealth of stockholders is determined by others. It fluctu-
ates, is liquid, and cannot be employed by them. They own only
a symbol of ownership. When the owners were in control, there
was at least an assumption that they would operate the business
in their own interests, but there is no longer any guaranty that
it will be operated even in this way. Those in control may not
be interested either in profits for the stockholders or the distri-
bution of profits or the marketability of securities. Those in
control of our quasi public corporations, of course, are not en-
titled to the bulk of the profits; hence, they certainly cannot be
motivated by the profit motive. Under such circumstances, it
is difficult to determine for what end a corporation may be run.
When it is remembered that the power over our huge corpora-
tions is not in the shareholders, or the bondholders, or the em-
ployees, or public consumers, but in the hands of. a relatively
few called management, the implications of the situation begin
to appear. Those in control may desire profits, especially for
themselves, but they are not the stockholders and therefore the
so-called owners. Hence, if they would gain profits, they must
sell to their corporations things which they own, or wreck their
corporations, or shift profits to subsidiary corporations which
they own, or speculate on the stock market in the buying and
selling of stock. The motives in capitalism today are not so
much probably profits either for the owners or for the controllers
as the motives which actuated Alexander the Great.
COMPETITON
Competition, also, in modern times has ceased to operate in
the way planned for it by the classicists. It has now developed
either into monopoly or into cut throat competition.
Thus, it is seen that none of the characteristics of capitalism
which Adam Smith emphasized any longer exist. Yet, in spite
K. L. J.-5
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of all this, the believers in and the minions of capitalism still
adhere to the old doctrines of Adam Smith. The terms and con-
cepts remain, although the economic conditions have changed so
that new terms and new concepts are imperatively necessary.
Capitalism itself has been undergoing such internal changes
that it itself has largely destroyed many of the doctrines to
which its believers still adhere. The corporate form of business
organization and ownership has largely been responsible for
these changes. More and more, private ownership has been
overthrown and individual liberty subjected to the control of
corporations. Adam Smith combated corporations as unfit to
accomplish the results which he advocated. Yet today corpora-
tions dominate our economic life and have dethroned all of
Adam Smith's generalizations. In spite of this, however, the
disciples of Adam Smith still both claim to believe in his doc-
trines and also in the institution of the corporation.
The result of all this is not merely a change in the nature
of capitalism, but the creation of an economic order which has
proven unworkable. Left to itself, capitalism has shown that it
is vicious and impossible. It has turned out to be a house built
on the sand. The profit motive largely exempted from social
control has, with the other factors of capitalism, resulted in
such concentration of wealth as to reduce our purchasing power
so far below our producing power as to stop the operat;on of the
wonderful economic machine for mass production which it has
created. It would be economic suicide to continue to produce
products which cannot be sold. This was the cause of our last
depression, and our last depression was so serious that it came
closer to wrecking our capitalistic system than most of those in-
side the system realized. Individualism, competition, greed, in-
dustrial warfare and the concentration of wealth caused un-
employment, bankruptcy, poverty, crime, racketeering, lawless-
ness, disease, illiteracy, degeneracy, immorality and economic
chaos. Capitalism has demonstrated that it cannot make itself
work and that if nothing is done about the situation, it will
simply perish from off the earth. Individualism, no matter
how rugged, is doomed. The only question left is whether or
not social control should be applied to capitalism so as to save
it, and this involves two questions: first, whether or not capital-
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ism is worth saving; and second, whether or not it can be saved
by social planning even if it is worth saving.
SOCw. PLANNING AND CONTROL
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the pass into
which capitalism has come is not the result of social control, but
the result of allowing capitalism to operate without social con-
troL It is true that under our Constitution capitalism has had
a great amount of social control. Some of this social control has
taken the form of the protection of capitalism against other
social forces. Some of this social control has taken the form of
subjecting capitalism to control for the protection of other social
interests. We have already made a study of these matters, but
perhaps at this point a brief summary will help to appreciate
the situation.
Among the illustrations of the protection of capitalism
afforded by our capitalistic system may be named: the provi-
sions with reference to the payment of debts; the property in
slaves, the prohibition on the states' making anything but gold
and silver coin tender; the prohibition of taxation of imports
and exports by the states and of exports by the federal govern-
ment; the guaranties of the privileges and immunities clauses,
both relating to state citizens and to federal citizens; our dual
form of government and separation of powers; the provision
against impairing the obligation of contracts which the Supreme
Court extended to the protection of conveyances and of private
corporations; the protection of freedom of contract finally
established under the due process clause after protection was
iiarrowly avoided under the contracts clause and the privileges
and immunities clause, the protection of interstate commerce
and, incidentally, some intrastate commerce against state social
control; the protection against class legislation of the equality
clause; and the protection of the due process clause. Of course,
the greatest protection of capitalism has been afforded by the
due process clause as a matter of substance, and here capitalism
has been protected against the police power in the matter of
regulation of wages, the fixing of prices outside of public utili-
ties, discrimination against private schools, the requirement of
the covering of fruit, segregation of races geographically, mak-
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ing private businesses public callings, the abolition of the in-
junction, and the control of child labor by the United States.
Capitalism has been protected against taxation by the require-
ment of public purpose, the protection against multi-taxation,
and against retroactive taxation. It has been protected against
eminent domain by the requirements of public use and a taking
in the eminent domain sense and compensation.
Among the illustrations of the delimitation of the personal
liberty of capitalism rather than its protection may be named,
first, the social control permitted in the exercise by the states of
the police power, taxation and eminent domain, in spite of the
obligation of contracts clause by a reinterpretation of the protec-
tion afforded by this clause. Another method whereby capitalistic
freedom has been delimited has been through the exercise of a
general police power by the United States Government under the
commerce clause. But the greatest social control of capitalism
has occurred in connection with the due process clause as a
matter of substance where the Supreme Court, after first extend-
ing the protection of the due process clause as a matter of sub-
stance to capitalism, then permitted both the states and the
federal government to exercise social control over capitalism,
wherever the Supreme Court thought there was a proper exercise
of the police power or the power of taxation or the power of
eminent domain. Here, practically the whole law relating to
public utilities has been lifted out of the realm of contracts and
placed under legal obligations imposed by law, although it
should be noted that much of the social control first established
in this field has in the course of time been frittered away by
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The hours of
labor permitted by employers have been controlled. Anti-trust
laws have been passed and upheld. Laws have been passed and
upheld controlling the liquor traffic, vaccination, the speed of
trains, protecting the social interest in the aesthetic, human re-
sources, natural resources, banking system, fair competition, em-
ployees' liability, and government ownership. Income taxes
have been allowed to increase revenue, and government owner-
ship has been held constitutional. Chain store taxation has
been justified, and taxation of state imports by the federal gov-
ernment has been permitted.
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While we see from this enumeration that there has been
both great protection and great subjection of capitalism by
social control, yet, on the whole, capitalism has received more
protection than it has social control. This was especially true
in those constitutional periods dominated by Chief Justice
.Marshall and by Justice Field. The greatest subjection of
capitalism to social control has been occurring in the recent
Anglo-American period of socialization. 3ut neither in this
period nor in any other period has the matter of a corporate
organization been subjected to social control in any attempt to
prevent the developments in our industrial order which have
occurred since the days of Adam Smith. Hence, neither our
Supreme Court nor our Constitution can be blamed for the
present economic situation in which the American people find
themselves. The blame, so far as any blame attaches to anyone,
must be borne by the capitalistic system itself. As we have al-
ready seen, the capitalistic system has, because of the modern
corporation, not only failed to obtain the great ends which
Adam Smith and the other classical economists claimed that it
would attain, but has also destroyed any of its characteristics
which already existed in our economic order, and the corpora-
tion, like a Frankenstein monster, is now turning upon its
capitalistic creator in an effort to destroy it. Finance capitalism
has succeeded all other forms of capitalism and has affected
many of the earlier rules, but it has not been able to evolve a
technique to control the giant corporation. The courts, on the
whole, have waited in vain for a crystallization of capitalistic
attitudes. A decisive minority has worked interstitially,
especially in connection with the police power, to gain control
and give direction to the capitalistic system. But it has not
gained enough control to affect the current of economic develop-
ment.
It is evident, therefore, that we have had too much economic
freedom and not enough social planning. We have too much
allowed our highly specialized social body to function without
any social brain or spinal cord to coordinate the activities of the
different specialized parts. The great objection to social plan-
ning has always been that it would destroy private enterprise,
individual initiative, freedom of contract and competition.
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Even if it were admitted that these were desirable ends, the
answer to this objection is that all of these so-called character-
istics of our capitalistic system have already been destroyed.
As we have seen, the corporation has already destroyed rugged
individualism, and under corporate management freedom of
initiative is a sheer fiction. Under a new economy, there would
be no more regimentation than now exists, but it would be de-
termined by social need instead of private greed. What we have
in this country will have to be called a capitalistic democracy.
There is a profound contradiction between capitalism and
democracy. Capitalism as now developed emphasizes the power
of the few; democracy, the power of the many. Capitalism is
distinguished by a narrow concentration of economic power;
democracy, by the wide-spread distribution of political power.
Appalling inequalities abound in the economic sphere; formal
equality is enjoyed in the political sphere. There is a great gulf,
therefore, between the economic ideal and the political ideal.
The forces concerned with economic power are anxious to reach
out for political power. The forces concerned with political
power would like to bring economic power within their sway.
In the past, the press, the educational system, military establish-
ment, bureaucracy, though classed as political agencies, and,
of course, the general economic agencies, have, on the whole,
been instruments for the forces of the economic order. Most
other political agencies and some economic agencies have been
instrumentalities of the political order. These forces have been
making for conflict. This conflict is beginning to threaten the
overthrow of one or the other of our systems. Unless there is
evolved some wasy of making the two systems compromise their
difficulties, it is inevitable that one or the other must be over-
thrown. Social planning can prevent this catastrophe.
If we are to have social planning, what form should this
social planning take, and who should do the social planning?
The last depression has been teaching us that there can be no
fixed form of government. Its patterns, like those of industry,
must be mutable; the design must follow the event. But one of
two general courses must be pursued. Either some other system
must be substituted for our capitalistic system or our old capital-
istic system must be reformed. If some other system is to be
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substituted, it will be a very difficult matter to determine what
system, and it would be more difficult to substitute it. If the old
system is to be reformed, many other problems will arise. For
example, what social control should be exercised over securities;
over the distribution of wealth; over price fixing; over public
utilities; over our banking system? Should protection be given
to the few or the many, to property or humanity? Should
wealth or poverty be taxed ? Should producers or consumers
have the greater considerationI
If we are to have social planning, who should do this work?
The Supreme Court cannot take the initiative. It cannot be a
leader. It may determine the final direction of our social con-
trol, or perhaps even prevent all plans of social control, but
someone else must take the initiative. Shall this initiative be
taken by the capitalistic system? It is very doubtful whether
capitalism can give the court another clear faith and articulate
ideology. Before the depression, business men were prating
about less government in business and more business in govern-
ment, whatever the latter meant. They hitched their fortunes to
the stars of individualism, competition and laissez faire. New
inventions and mass productions increased their power of pro-
duction. But a new problem of a necessity to increase purchas-
ing power arose. Business men could not see this. This was no
part of their economic theories. As a consequence, business was
borne down by one disaster after another until it at last crept
to a standstill. Millions of blameless people shuffled in bread-
lines; banks were closed; farmers revolted; creditors saw their
wealth vanish; and business men generally suffered a paralysis
of the will. They had no solution for our problem. They at
last practically admitted defeat and had the grace to step aside
for the time being, although they continued to mumble their old
shibboleths. As they stepped aside, those whom they formerly
had scorned, the members of the so-called "brain trust,"
stepped forward to present various schemes of social planning
with a view to turn what was about to be a disorderly overthrow
of the old capitalistic structure into a peaceful and orderly evo-
lution. Just at this time, a new political administration was
voted into power, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, and
this administration decided to put into operation some of the
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plans of this so-called "brain trust." The Franklin D. Roose-
velt administration chose to attempt to reform the old capital-
istic system rather than to attempt to substitute some new eco-
nomic system for it.
PRoGBA OF TiE FRANKLI D. ROOSEVELT ADM.ISTRATION
The scheme of social planning inaugurated by the Franklin
. Roosevelt administration is on a scale never dreamed of by
the founding fathers. The main point in this scheme is to bal-
ance in the United States purchasing and producing power by
an attempt to break up our concentration of wealth. As yet
this scheme of social planning has not attempted to break up our
concentration of wealth through radical changes in our system
of taxation and the direct limitation of profits, but it has under-
taken to increase purchasing power by regulating the weight of
the dollar, overriding the gold clauses in contracts, making new
government notes legal tender, stopping of gold hoarding, the
declaration of a bank holiday, control of the sale of securities,
the establishment of a Tennessee Valley authority, the Home
Loan Corporation, Farm Loan Corporation, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and a general program of economic plan-
ning (N. R. A. and'A. A. A.) affecting the most important rela-
tions of labor, agriculture and industry, especially through
regulating minimum wages and the maximum hours of employ-
ment.
These economic measures raise constitutional questions of
vast importance. Many constitutional doctrines seem to be af-
fected by these measures. Will the Supreme Court hold that
the Constitution prohibits what is attempted by the Franklin
D. Roosevelt program, or will the Supreme Court stretch the
Constitution as it has been stretched on prior occasions to meet
this new emergency? On the answer to this question, depends
the success, if it otherwise succeeds, of the whole Franklin 3.
Roosevelt program. If the Supreme Court declares the pro-
gram unconstitutional, there will be nothing left but capitalistic
chaos or a violent revolution or a radical formal amendment of
our Constitution. If it upholds the program, it will write new
constitutional law as important as any written by Chief Justice
Marshall or Justice Field or Justice Holmes.
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What will the Supreme Court have to do to uphold the
Franklin D. Roosevelt program? The constitutional questions
raised by the pieces of legislation inaugurated by the Franklin
D. Roosevelt administration relate principally to our dual form
of government, our doctrine of separation of powers, and the
protection against social control found in the United States
Constitution. The question of the violation of our dual form
of government is raised by the legislation as to the weight of the
dollar, the gold clauses, the legal tender notes, the gold hoard-
ing, the bank holiday, the Securities Act, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the Farm Loan Act, Home Owners' Act, Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, and the economic planning. The
question of the violation of our separation of powers is raised
also by practically everyone of these pieces of legislation. The
question of the violation of constitutional guaranties against
social control is raised by the gold clause, the legal tender notes,
gold hoarding, Securities Act, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Farm Loan Act, Home Owners' Act, Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, and economic planing.
To uphold this program, the Supreme Court will have to
find, first, that our dual form of government is not violated be-
cause the federal government has either the express or implied
power to do all of the things which it has undertaken. So far
as the control of the weight of the dollar is concerned, there is
little difficulty because Congress has this express power. So far
as the gold clauses are concerned, it can easily find that Con-
gress has such an implied power because of its express powers
to coin money and to borrow money. The question of the power
of Congress to issue legal tender notes has already been thor-
oughly established by prior decisions and has been derived from
the power to borrow money and the power to issue bills of credit.
The power to control gold hoarding also can easily be implied
from the money power, as can the power to declare a bank
holiday. The power of Congress to pass the Securities Act can
be derived from its power over interstate commerce, and its
postal authority; its power to establish the Tennessee Valley
Authority, from its power over navigation and its war power;
and its power to pass the Farm Loan Act, the Home Owners'
Act and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Emer-
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gency Relief Act, from its power to appropriate money for the
general welfare.
The power of Congress to pass the National Recovery Act
and the Agricultural Adrninstration Act and to establish social
control over the economic, business and agricultural life of the
nation will have to be related to the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. So far as Congress appropriates
money, the power may be derived from the general welfare
clause, but its general police power over these matters will have
to be derived from some other source. Where there is either
traffic or transportation between people in one state and people
in another, the interstate commerce clause would be sufficient
authority for the federal government, but in order to give the
federal government power to regulate local state business in all
of its aspects before traffic or transportation has begun is going
to be more difficult. Perhaps the Supreme Court will find that.
Congress has this power because of the interblending of local
state business and interstate business, so that the local state
business can be regulated to prevent it being a burden on inter-
state commerce business.
In the second place, it will have to find that our separa-
tion of powers has not been violated, and to do this, it will
have to find that Congress has not delegated legislative powers
to the President. But it can do this by holding that Congress
has not delegated its power but set up a standard for the
President to administer in the case of fixing the weight of the
dollar, stopping gold hoarding, establishing the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority, and providing for economic planning. In the
other pieces of legislation, Congress has acted directly, so that
there will be no difficulty on this point. In some cases, it will
be difficult to find that the President is merely administering
a standard rather than legislating, but the Supreme Court has
already, in connection with interstate commerce,' 8 7 and the
flexible tariff,' 88 gone very far in upholding such legislation as
is herein involved.
In the third place, so far as concerns the question of vio-
lation of protection against social control, it will have to find
=Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson (1894), 154 U. S.
447.
'J. W. Hampton, Jr., d Go. v. United States (1928), 276 U. S. 394.
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that the gold hoarding order is not a violation of due process
as a matter of procedure in failing to provide a hearing and
of due process as a matter of substance because an exercise
of the police power, and not eminent domain; and that the
other pieces of legislation are proper exercises of the police
power. So far as concerns the fixing of the gold content
of the dollar and the declaration of a bank holiday, there is
no difficulty because there are no limitations of due process
which would apply to the federal government. In the matter
of gold hoarding, undoubtedly due process would be a limi-
tation, but this limitation is satisfied because of the social
interest in a stable currency if the power exercised is rational-
ized as a police power. Some have contended that the federal
government is exercising the power of eminent domain. In
such case, problems of a jury trial and just compensation would
be encountered. But the better opinion is that the govern-
ment is not exercising a power of eminent domain, but a police
power, because it is not taking private property for a public
use, but is regulating the use of money by its people, and because
it is doubtful whether or not money is subject to the power of
eminent domain. The gold clauses legislation and the legal
tender notes legislation should also be rationalized as proper
exercises of the police power.lssa The legal tender problem
has been definitely settled by decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. The power of the government to cancel the
gold clauses provisions in its own contracts can be derived from
its power to define what shall be legal tender and from its im-
munity against suit without its consent; and its power to over-
ride the gold clauses in private contracts can be derived from
its power over legal tender and its authority to call in gold
coins. It may be held that thereby the performance of con-
tract conditions has been frustrated. Such contracts create
debts, not sales of a commodity. The government has the power
to say what shall be the legal tender for the payment of debts,
and it is due process of law to change the legal tender from two
standards to one standard. The Security Act is a proper exer-
cise of the police power because of the social interest in eco-
nomic progress. The Tennessee Valley Authority can be ration-
2 A anna, Currency Control and Private Property, 33 Col. L. Rev.
617, 636.
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alized as a police power incidental to the war power and the
power to improve navigation. The appropriations of money
afford no difficulty. If the federal government once constitu-
tionally obtains revenue, there are apparently no limitations
on the way it may spend it, except those which Congress may
put on itself. 189
That leaves as the great problem the question of whether
or not the program of economic planning (that is, the N.R.A.
and the A.A.A.) is a proper exercise of the police power, and
this involves five minor questions. The first is whether or not
it is constitutional to regulate prices outside of public utilities.
Before the case of Stephenson v. Binford,190 anyone would have
hesitated to have taken the position that the Supreme Court
would uphold such a power, but since this case upheld price
regulation of private contract carriers, it would seems that it
would be the logical step for the Supreme Court to uphold any
general scheme of price regulation. The second is the con-
stitutionality of the limitation of hours of labor. In its first
decisions on this point, the Supreme Court refused to uphold
hours of labor, but it has since reversed itself and now so com-
pletely upholds them1 91 that there should be no question on this
point except for the First Child Labor decision which held that
even though it was constitutional for the states to pass child
labor laws,192 the federal government had no such power under
the interstate commerce clause. This, therefore, really involves
the question of our dual form of government; but before the
Franklin D. Roosevelt program can be upheld, this child labor
decision will, of course, have to be overruled. The third re-
lates to the minimum wage provision in the economic planning
law. The United States Supreme Court has in one decision
heretofore declared a minimum wage law, even where the fed-
eral government otherwise would have the power, unconstitu-
tional because in violation of the due process clause.193 Hence,
2w Massachusetts v. Mellon and, Frothingham (1923), 262 U. S. 44T.
- (1932), 53 S. Ct. 181. See also lNebbia v. People of N. Y. (1934),
54 S. Ct. 505.
=Muler v. Oregon (1908), 208 U. -S. 412; Bunting v. Oregon
(1917), 243 U. S. 426.
"Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), 247 U. S. 251.
='Adkins v. Children's Hospiat of the District of Columbia (1923),
261 U. S. 525.
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this ease, also, will have to be overruled if the Supreme Court
is going to uphold the constitutionality of the program for
econaomi planning.
The fourth is the constitutionality of the collective bar-
gaining feature of the N. R. A. program. Where this and other
features of the N. R. A. program are carried out by voluntary
agreement, there is no question; but where the provisions of
the N. R. A. program are going to be imposed by law upon
unwilling members of society, the question is directly presented.
Adair v. United States'9 4 held that, to make it unlawful for an
employer to threaten an employee with loss of employment for
membership in a labor union was unconstitutional because of
its abridgement of the freedom of contract. Coppage v. The
State of Kansas 9 5 followed the Adair case and applied its
doctrine so as to permit an employer to require the so-called
yellow dog contracts not to join or retain membership in labor
organizations. If these were the only cases on the subject, they
would have to be overruled in spirit at least if the provisions of
the N. R. A. in question were to be upheld. However, the mnore
recent case of Texas and N. 0. Railway v. The Brotherhood of
Railway and S. S. Clerks1 96 upheld the Railway Labor Act of
1926 with its feature of collective bargaining. This case would
seem to indicate that the Supreme Court will be able to uphold
the constitutionality of the N. R. A. program so far as concerns
this point. The fifth involves the question of whether or not
in the processing features of the A. A. A. program there is a
public purpose in the levying of a tax to reimburse some at the
expense of others. On this point, the Supreme Court has already
held that the number benefitted is an important although not a
decisive consideration. 197 It has also been very liberal in up-
holding classification for the levying of taxes.198 For these
reasons, it would seem that the prior decisions of the United
' (1908), 208 U. S. 161.
2 (1915), 236 U. S. 1.
- (1930), 281 U. S. 548.
3"Loan Association v. Topeka (1874), 20 Wall. 655: Milheim v.
Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., et al. (1923), 262 U. S. 710; 80
Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 1023; 42 Yale Law Journ. 762; 31 Mich. Law
Rev. 120.
"State Board of Tax Commrs. of Indiana v. Jackson (1931), 283
U. S. 527; 7 Ind. Law Sourn. 179.
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States Supreme Court will not stand in the way of its uphold-
ing this feature of the A. A. A. program.
Will the Supreme Court uphold the Franklin D. Roosevelt
program?. The writer is not so much worried over what the
Supreme Court will do as he is over what the Roosevelt program
will do. He is afraid that not enough has as yet been attempted
by the Roosevelt program to restore the balance between pur-
chasing power and producing power. There has been lack of
co-operation, if not actual sabotage, on the part of the former
beneficiaries of the capitalistic system. As a consequence, there
is danger that any increase in purchasing power will be more
than matched by an increase in producing power. For this
reason, he is of the opinion that, if the Roosevelt program is
to accomplish its desired result, it will have to move on to an-
other stage, in which it will undertake, in the first place, to re-
form our tax system so as to make the rich, not the poor, carry
the tax burden in the future and thereby gradually to break up
the swollen fortunes in the United States and to transfer wealth
from those who will not buy but will produce or invest, to
those who will buy; and, in the second place, to limit profits by
governmental reduction of high salaries and bonuses and the
rates of return allowed public utilities, so as to prevent pro-
ducers, through holding companies, speculation and other
schemes of high finance, from getting too much from consumers,
and thereby to keep in the consuming class a sufficient purchas-
ing power to maintain the proper balance between producing
and consuming power. Prices and profits can be controlled.
This is proven by the history of the trusts and of the war-time
Lever Act. If the Roosevelt program should move on to this
stage, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would
offer little constitutional difficulty on the score of taxation, but
for the control of profits the Baltimore Street Railway case' 99
and some other public utility cases would have to be overruled.
Yet, the recent cases upholding wage and price fixing seem to
point the way for the Supreme Court.
Would even the reform of taxation and the control of
profits be enough to solve the problem called to our attention
by the recent depression? The capitalistic system was a com-
09 United Railways, Etc., Co. v. West (1930), 280 U. S. 234.
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petitive system on the basis of private profits. There has been
no motive in the competitive system except the profit motive.
Such a tax program and control of profits as suggested would
largely destroy the profit motive. Would it be possible to main-
tain competition except on a laissez faire basis? It will have to
be admitted that here is a very real danger that such social
planning would destroy the last vestige of the capitalistic sys-
tem. It might not be possible to curtail competition and also
to keep it. In that event, the only alternative left for the Roose-
velt program would be for it to move on to a third stage wherein
the government would take over business and operate it for the
public welfare. That is, it would have to displace the com-
petitive system by a system of social operation of economic
processes for the general welfare of society. If the Roosevelt
program should move on to this stage, the constitutional diffi-
culties would be staggering. Probably if governmental opera-
tion were to be undertaken by the states and local subdivisions
of the states, the decisions of Jones v. Portland200 and Green v.
Irazier2 01 would be sufficient authority, at least so long as the
governmental operation was confined to the field now occupied
by the public utilities, which would seem to be a big enough field
even for governmental operation. But if this governmental
operation were to be undertaken by the federal government, it
would have to be in connection with such powers of the federal
government as the commerce power, the postal power, patent
and copyright power, and the war power, which would mean
that its field would have to be much narrower than that which
the states might occupy. However, even this would be no in-
considerable field, and perhaps the federal government, either
through its power to appropriate money for the general welfare
or through the power of example, might persuade the states to
cooperate with its program.
Again, we ask the question: Will the Supreme Court uphold
the Roosevelt program in one or all three of these stages? It is
the opinion of the writer that it will do so. He believes that the
present emergency is such and the capacity of the United States
Supreme Court finally to think through for itself our great
social problems is such that the Supreme Court without change
(1917), 245 U. S. 217.
(1920), 253 U. S. 233.
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in personnel will overrule the decisions to which reference has
been made-which were five to four decisions in the first place
and which were decisions whose validity has been questioned
from many different sources-so as to add a new chapter to the
powers of the federal government, to further delimit personal
liberty in the exercise of the police power, and to protect the
social interest in economic human progress as it has never been
protected before. When the Supreme Court realizes that our
distress does not arise from any lack of goods or from the eco-
nomic realities of our situation, but from our artificial capitalis-
tic system of producing and distributing goods for private
profit, the Supreme Court is going to find a way to end our
distress. He believes that it will not permit the old scheme of
financial power or any new scheme of dictatorial political power
to destroy individualism, nor allow unbridled individualism to
destroy political power and repeat the rebarbarization of the
world; but will discover a scheme to preserve the freedom and
adaptability of individualism and to socially plan it so as to
coordinate its good activities and curb its evil tendencies. In
this way, it will make the people the masters rather than the
victims of destiny and give democracy both an ambition for an
ordered society and an opportunity to acquire the discipline to
establish and maintain it. The Supreme Court will invent
some means to stifle the conflicts which have been destroying
civilization and to save our institutions from the poison of un-
limited greed, so as to turn the results of common effort toward
general benefits. The Roosevelt program grows logically and
articulately out of former precedents of the United States Su-
preme Court. There will be no breach of continuity in uphold-
ing this program if the precedents are permitted to unfold and
develop. In the future economic affairs will no longer be left
to automatic controls or private controls, but will be sabjected
to social control
